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Abstract
The difference between object-language and metalanguage is crucial
for logical analysis, but has yet not been examined for the field of com-
puter science. In this paper the difference is examined with regard to
inferential relations. It is argued that inferential relations in a metalan-
guage (like a calculus for propositional logic) cannot represent conceptual
relations of natural language. Inferential relations govern our concept use
and understanding. Several approaches in the field of Natural Language
Understanding (NLU) and Natural Language Inference (NLI) take this in-
sight in account, but do not consider, how an inference can be assessed as a
good inference. I present a logical analysis that can assesss the normative
dimension of inferences, which is a crucial part of logical understanding
and goes beyond formal understanding of metalanguages.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context – Commitments
Language is not only descriptive, it is also normative. Just by describing lan-
guage and how it is used, i.e. creating models from language use, it will not
be possible to recreate an ability that yields understanding. That language is
normative does not only mean that language use is guided by norms, but it also
implies a certain assessment of what is correct and what is incorrect language
use. Dictionaries and grammar books encapsulate the correct use of a natural
language, so does logic for artificial as well as for natural languages.
1.2 Problem
Approaches in the field of natural language understanding focus on the descrip-
tive part of language use. They describe how language is used. It can lead to a
certain understanding or better representation of the language usage of a group
and depict maybe also to a certain degree a semantic component, but it will not
yield a more complete understanding of semantic significance, unless also the
normative component is considered. Normativity is a key part of meaning.
We play different language games that are governed by different norms. Our
assessment of the normative significance guides our understanding. Normative
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assessment of meaning is something exceptionally done by humans, but can it be
also computed or to a certain degree expressed in mathematical models? First
and foremost it has to be examined, how it can be expressed logically in order
to see how it can be implemented in a mathematical model.
1.3 Motivation – The Status of Logic
It is important to distinguish between the status of the forms of languages
that are used. The distinction between object-language and metalanguage is
crucial, because the metalanguage allows the possibility to talk about the object-
language and the concepts that cannot be expressed in the object-language. Paul
Hoyningen-Huene calls the metalanguage of statement logic (object-language)
“metalogic of statement logic”.[1] It allows one to express the concepts of “logical
truth” and “valid inference” for statement logic. Both concepts are determined
by the use of the operators in statement logic and are purely syntactical. The
logical truths of statement logic are therefore also only tautologies. It is possible
to build a calculus of statement logic as a metalanguage.
Scientific examinations are written in natural language, but it is not directly
a metalanguage in the logical sense, because it describes examined objects,
although e.g., you can write an examination about German grammar in English.
English is then your metalanguage that you use to describe German: the object-
language. The difference between metalanguange and object-language can also
be used to clarify, about what one talks, i.e. what is the object: an object/entity
or an expression (e.g. the name of a city or the city itself). But when it comes to
describe and assess the logic of language, this distinction faces several problems.
Logic is not just a formal tool that formulates a calculus of an object-
language in an artificial metalanguage, it is part of the use of language. The
attempt of this paper is to understand the status of logic in language use. I
believe that making explicit this status will not only lead to a deeper under-
standing of logic and language, but will also enable us to build mathematical
models of natural language that can be used in machine learning.
2 Philosophical Background
Kurt Gödel writes that “every precisely formulated yes-and-no question in math-
ematics must have a clear-cut answer.”[2] (379) Gödel was a Platonist and be-
lieved that there is a universe of all possible discourse, when it comes to math-
ematical objects. This ontological part has to be considered. Many problems
about the foundations of mathematics in the first half of the 20th century were
centered around the connection of set theory and logic as the fundament of
mathematics.[3] Logic gives in a certain way the syntactical or formal structure
and set theory the semantical or ontological component.1 It depends in a way
then on one´s “ontological commitment” to mathematical objects and how big
1The disjunction “or” should not mean that these terms can be used as synonyms. This
connection is much more complicated.
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the ontological realm should be, i.e. what it all includes, e.g. physical objects,
mathematical objects, and so forth. Willard Van Orman Quine sees them as
“myths” that are “good and useful”, because they simplify our theories.[4] The
problem is that these mathematical objects should serve as truth-makers of
mathematical propositions and if there is a possible universe of all mathemati-
cal objects, then this implies that the propositions are decidable. It seems like
Gödel had the idea that such a decidability for mathematics could be possible[3],
despite his incompleteness theorems. – It is not the case that there exists a uni-
verse of all possible discourse with truth-makers for propositions or concepts.
We do not discover the meaning of them and there can also not be some kind
of “metaphysical glue”[5] (109) that attaches a word to a referent or object that
conveys or gives meaning to the word or also to a proposition.
Gödel´s incompleteness theorems stem from the phenomenon of self-reference,
i.e. a system is powerful enough to talk about itself or at least to name objects.
The system or mathematical model is able to formalize mathematical objects
via natural numbers (the so called “Gödel numbering”). Every arithmetic for-
mula is coded as a number and is assigned a definite Gödel number. The Gödel
numbering is now used to formulate formulas that are expressively powerful
enough to define concepts like “provable formula” and then also the negation of
this concept.[6] (175/176) It is sometimes expressed in the following way:
F = “I am not provable.”[7]
Gödel writes that we have a sentence that asserts its own unprovability.[6] (175)
“Suppose, F is wrong. Then F can be proven and has therefore shown that
F is not provable. This is a contradiction. Thus, F is true and therefore not
provable.”[7]
Of course, it is a mix up of the predicates “true” and “provable”. Gödel
plays with the similarity of the meaning “provable” and “true”. The former
is a property of formulas and the latter a property of sentences. Gödel also
mentions that these ideas are cognate with the liar paradox, where it is just
about the truth of statements.[6] Tarski developed this problem further in the
field of semantics towards a formalized theory of truth.[8] Both contributions
to logic lie on the possibility of building a metalanguage to speak about an
object-language.
It is problematic to hang the reflexivity of language on the difference be-
tween metalanguage and object-language, because the metalanguage consists of
(abstract) names (metavariables) for the object-language, where it is about the
use of language. One of the consequences of Gödel´s incompleteness theorems
is that the construction of a metalanguage with well-defined names for predi-
cates like “provable” or “true” is not possible, because it leads to contradictions.
It has not been possible to develop a well-defined metalogical or metamath-
ematical model with well-defined names for “provable” or “true” and despite
that the mathematicians use proofs and despite that the philosophers use the
predicate “true”, so it does not seem to confound us in our use of these words
or better in the language games that we play. – I believe that the reflexivity
of language stems from an epistemic gap between holding something for true
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and that something is true (or between seeming right and being right).[9] (§§
293 and 303) The possibility to err or to be wrong opens up the language game
that we play. (How this is connected with modal logic, will be explained below.)
Artificial languages and formalization help to disambiguate the meaning of sen-
tences and to understand the important distinction between metalanguage and
object-language. This logical distinction can be sometimes seen as pedantic, but
it is important to not get lost in the debates in linguistics, computer science,
mathematics, and philosophy. It has to be clear, if it is just a name or if the
word is used in a language and also how it is used. Naming something is also
using a word (like e.g. predicating). Peter Geach pointed out that there is a
difference between calling a thing “P” and predicating of a thing “P”. It may
be that the predication “P” of a thing is embedded in an if-then-clause or in a
disjunctive proposition[10] and then it is embedded in a logical context.2
“To say, ‘If the policeman´s statement is true, the motorist touched
6o mph’ is not to call the policeman´s statement true; to say, ‘If
gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad’ is not to call
either gambling or invitations to gamble ‘bad.’”[10] (223)
True is used here as a descriptive predicate. It makes the content judgeable
and does not solely take it as a speech act (ascription).[11] (31/32)3 The if-
then-clause specifies also under which circumstances it should be correct to call
the policeman´s statement true. It gives to the descriptive content a normative
assessment, because “true” is a normative concept and not a descriptive concept.
If one commits oneself to the antecedent, one also has to commit onself to the
consequent. Committing onself is a normative doing along with being entitled
to a claim.[12]4
If we want to understand what meaning means, we cannot just look at the
manipulation of symbols. This would be just manipulating strings of names con-
nected by logical operators. At least this is the valid insight of John Searle´s
thought experiment about the chinese room. The outcome of the argument is
that understanding natural languages is something more than to follow rules
or instructions.[14] But then how can the trick be done? This question is not
answered by Searle. He believes that we first need to understand the brain to
build something like a strong artificial intelligence that understands natural lan-
guages. It might be also a valid way to first look at technological advancements,
to understand how the trick is done. Therefore, one should look into the field
of “Natural Language Understanding” (NLU) in computer science.
2Another example that reflects the ideas of this paper is: If there is not a universe of all
possible discourse with meaningful facts, that warrants objectivity, then meaning does not
have to be subjective.
3Brandom emphasizes this point specifically for the connection of philosophy of language,
cognitive science, and artificial intelligence in the chapter “How Analytic Philosophy Has Failed
Cognitive Science”.
4Commitment and entitlement are deontic concepts. See [13]
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3 Literature Review
3.1 General Outlook – Natural Language Understanding
There are different forms of understanding that have to be considered. There are
approaches that group together expressions that have similar meanings. This
can be done by vector space models of semantics. (For a general overview of
these models see Turney et al. (2010).[15]) Another form of understanding is
to be able to answer queries about a text. Hermann et. al. (2015) present
a model that can identify objects (expressions) within a text as answers to
questions.[16] Evans et al. (2018) propose a model for “recognizing entailment
between logical formulas”. Of course, they also state that there is a differ-
ence between recognizing entailment between logical formulas and “recognizing
entailment between natural language sentences”. “Evaluating an entailment be-
tween natural language sentences requires understanding the meaning of the
non-logical terms in the sentence.” They seem to have the idea that first the
formal logical understanding of the model has to work, before one can apply
it in natural language.5[17] (10) A crucial point is, how do they now that the
entailments are correct or valid? The write that “[e]ntailment is primarily a
semantic notion: A entails B if every model in which A is true is also a model
in which B is true.” This is a definition in the metalanguage of the calculus of
propositional logic and in order to “test if A |= B,” they “test whether A∧¬B is
satisfiable”.[17] (2/3) In the metalanguage of the calculus it is tested, whether
there is an inconsistency or not. The normative assessment is solely based on
the principle of avoiding inconsistency and establishing a consistent calculus.
3.2 Natural Language Inference
In 2006 Dagan et. al wrote one of the first papers in the field of Natural Lan-
guage Inference (NLI). They stated “that textual entailment recognition is a
suitable generic task for evaluating and comparing applied semantic inference
models.” And also hoped that “[e]ventually, such efforts can promote the de-
velopment of entailment recognition ‘engines’ which may provide useful generic
modules across applications.”[18]
Bowman et al. (2015a) elaborate a neural network model of a “relational
conception of semantics” as a counterpart to distributed semantic representa-
tion. The meaning is governed by the inferential conncetions:
“For instance, turtle is analyzed, not primarily by its extension in the
world, but rather by its lexical network: it entails reptile, excludes
chair, is entailed by sea turtle, and so forth. With generalized notions
of entailment and contradiction, these relationships can be defined
for all lexical categories as well as complex phrases, sentences, and
5“We believe that isolating the purely structural sub-problem will be useful because only
networks that can reliably predict entailment in a purely formal setting, such as propositional
(or first-order) logic, will be capable of getting these sorts of examples consistently correct.”
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even texts. The resulting theories of meaning offer valuable new ana-
lytic tools for tasks involving database inference, relation extraction,
and textual entailment.”[19]
The Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI) corpus[20] contains 570k sen-
tence pairs with the labels entailment, contradiction, and neutral and is used
e.g. also by Rocktäschel et al. (2015)[21] and Cases et al. (2017)[22]. Nie
et al. (2019) focus on another aspect of NLI: the elaboration of a data col-
lection method.[23] Geiger et al. (2018) propose a “method for generating ar-
tificial data sets in which the semantic complexity of individual examples can
be precisely characterized”. The “method is built around an interpreted formal
grammar that generates sentences containing multiple quantifiers, modifiers,
and negations”.[24] For an approach that relies on artificial data sets see also
Geiger et al. (2019)[25]. There have been also studies about monotonic infer-
ences through “interactions of entailment reasoning with negation”.6 Geiger et.
al. (2020) call it “Monotonicity NLI”.[26]
4 Problems of Reasoning
The SNLI corpus from Bowman et al. (2015) contains statements that are based
on descriptions of images. Entailment, contradictory, and neutral statements
were compiled and verified, but it is hard to reason with inferential relations
that were made like the ones in the corpus, because logical connectors govern
or should govern the correctness of inferences. The database is a descriptive
representation of language and does not include a normative assessment of the
inferential relations per se. It is something different to follow the rule and to be
able to assess the correctness of the rule. That is why Ludwig Wittgenstein says
that rule-following is a practice, because the mastery of a practice is something
else than just blindly following a rule.
If one claims that e.g. x is a turtle, then it might make sense to claim
that this claim excludes the claim that x is a chair (a contradictory statement).
And it makes sense to infer that, if x is a turtle, it is an animal (entailment
statement). One could now “infer” that a chair is also not an animal. That is
correct, but if the contradictory statement would be the claim that x is a bird,
one could make the inference that x is not an animal, which is not correct.
That a turtle is an animal is a form of inductive reasoning. It cannot be
just inferred whether a bird is an animal or not. It relies on other inferences
and facts – or on a semantic web that yet has not been established, but should
be learned. In deductive reasoning semantic relations can be established more
easily. If animal is contradictory to furniture, then all that is incompatible
with animal will also be incompatible with the more specific concepts (like e.g.
bird and turtle) that fall under the more general concept. But for deductive
reasoning also a semantic web has to be already established.
6“We would like to determine whether a system can actually reason about lexical entailment
and, furthermore, whether it has learned that negation is downward monotone (roughly, that
A entails B if, and only if, not-B entails not-A, for all A and B).”[26] (2)
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Robert Brandom introduces the idea of an incompatibility semantics that
is more precise with the logical vocabulary.[12] (121/122) Contradiction in for-
mal logic has a different sense than the use of contradiction in natural language
inferences in models of machine learning. Contradiction and entailment have
already a (logical) meaning that governs their use. One needs to be precise of
the use of concepts on a logical level otherwise the use of non-logical vocabulary
is even more difficult. Of course, in natural language we often understand the
ambiguous use of words or even the strange use of non-logical vocabulary, be-
cause we are mastering the practice of speaking and understanding the language
and we can (at least most of the time) make sense of it. – I believe that the
logic, that governs inferences, can be made explicit by modal vocabulary, which
hopefully can be represented in mathematical models.7
4.1 Modal Logic
Modal logic is an extension of propositional logic. The first extension is the so
called system K (after Saul Kripke) and the next extension is the system T.
This system introduces the following axiom:
ϕ→ ϕ8
With this axiom the following theorem can be proven:
ϕ→ ♦ϕ
Statements or compounded/combined statements are possible, if they are state-
ments. This marks an important difference to propositional logic, because to
take a statement as a possible statement, is taking it as a move within a language
game of giving and asking for reasons by making explicit e.g. entailments of the
statement that can serve as reasons. This is different to the usual semantic
approaches to modal logic that rests on the notion of possible worlds.
Kripke introduces the idea of possible worlds to represent the semantics of
modal logic. It is possible that a statement is true, if there exists at least one
possible world in which the statement is the case. The possible worlds can stand
in relations, which means that they are epistemically accessible.[27] We could
take e.g. our world as the initial possible world and think of counterfactual situ-
ations that represent other epistemically accessible possible worlds. The system
T has an important characteristic, if it is understood within the framework of a
possible world semantics. The system T is reflexive, i.e. that the possible world
is accessible to “itself” (wRw) or as Kripke writes: “It is clear that every world
7Brandom shows, how normative and deontic vocabulary (commitment and entitlement)
can make modal vocabulary explicit. Participating in practices of giving and asking for reasons
(as Wilfrid Sellars puts it) for the language games that we play. We are being held responsible
for our claims as commitments and have to justify, why and how we are entitled to these
commitments.[13, 12] This is a crucial part of a pragmatic approach to language and human
understanding, but it goes beyond what can be represented in mathematical models.
8I use greek letters for formulas, which belong to the metalanguage of propositional calcu-
lus. Latin letters are for statements of the object-language.
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H is possible relative to itself; for this simply says that every proposition true
in H is also possible in H.”[27] (70)
An analogy of a card game might be helpful to explain the idea of possible
worlds and the epistemic accesibility.[28] (132) A player knows her own cards,
but does not know the cards of all the other players, although it might be, that
the player knows some cards of other players (epistemically accesible worlds)
and it is possible for the player to imagine some cards of the other players
(counterfactual possible worlds). If she knows her own cards, then this could
also count as a certain kind of consciousness of her own (epistemic) states. This
kind of reflexivity is different to the difference of metalanguage and object-
language, that was mentioned above, which only originates from the possibility
of naming things in a metalanguage.
For statement or propositional logic a calculus can be developed by purely
syntactical means.[1] We have therefore a metalanguage that is purely syntac-
tical. The metalanguage contains words like proofability and derivability, but
these concepts have clearly also a modal background. Rudolf Carnap tried to
construct a syntactical metalanguage for modal logic[29] (250/151), while e.g.
Quine argued that modal logic opens an intensional context that is opaque.[30]
Therefore, a calculus in a syntactical metalanguage cannot be developed. I will
here not argue for one or the other side, but propose a different approach.
It is an important step in understanding that statements are only possibly
true and if they are possibly true that there is at least on possible world that
is epistemically accessible. Language is a social practice and different players
interact to know which statement is true. Introducing modal vocabulary is a
step in realizing that one is a player in that game with a certain epistemic
states (possible worlds). The epistemic states stand in possible relations with
each other. This relations can be expressed as incompatibility and compatibility
relations.
4.2 Incompatibility
The modal vocabulary operates in the scope of nonmontonic inferences, like
e.g. material inferences. They express good inferences based on the principle of
material incompatibility. The claim, if p then q, is incompatible with the claim
that it is possible that p and not-q.[12]
p→ q is incompatible with ♦(p ∧ ¬q)
p→ q is compatible with ♦(¬p ∨ q)
p← q is compatible (equivalent) with ♦(p ∨ ¬q)
Another logical equivalence is the law of contraposition (p → q) = (¬q → ¬p).
This law expresses a certain similarity to one tautology in statement logic: the
modus tollens (((p → q) ∧ ¬q) → ¬p). So, if you know that not-q is the case,
you can infer that not-p is the case, which expresses incompatibility relations
of entailments that go from a specific claim to a more general claim, e.g. if x is
a turtle, then it is an animal. And what is not an animal is also not a turtle.
8
With these material incompatibilities it can be seen, why chair is a bet-
ter contradictory statement to turtle than bird, because it supports more good
inferential relations. It lies also on a similar conceptual level. Chair entails fur-
niture and everything that is incompatible with furniture is a also incompatible
with chair and what is incompatible with animal is incompatible with turtle.
The only problem is that a chair has (often) four legs and so does a turtle. It
is a common property (of course there are different kinds of chairs, but let us
leave that aside, because we cannot assume that a algorithm “knows” something
like that). So, it cannot be that everything is incompatible in this case.
4.3 Entailment
What does now entailment mean? It has to be distinguished between different
kinds of entailments – there is e.g. the modus ponens (metalanguage) or the
implication (object-language) – to clarify the concept of entailment. The modus
ponens is a deductive form of reasoning:
(1) ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ therefore ψ
The modus ponens is sometimes called the “implication elimination”, because it
allows to eliminate the implication and to detach the consequent of the impli-
cation, i.e. to assert it. With regard to Gerhard Gentzen and his calculus of
natural deduction it can be represented the following way[31] (186):
(2) ϕ,ϕ⇒ψ
∴ψ
Deductive reasoning is certainly a sound way of reasoning, but the status of it
can nevertheless be questioned. Lewis Carroll´s story of the tortoise and Achilles
gives an insight about the difference of metalanguage and object-language and
the specific status that the modus ponens has. The tortoise does not accept
the consequent in a deductive inference and is not convinced by the application
of the rule of inference to detach the consequent. The tortoise adds another
premise that represents the rule of inference in the object-language (“If A and
B are true, Z must be true.”), but does still not accept the consequent and goes
on to add more premises that supposedly should represent the rule of inference
to finally detach the consequent.[32] Betrand Russell discusses these ideas by
distinguishing between the assertion of propositions and the meaning of “there-
fore” in the metalanguage on the one side and the meaning of “ implies” in the
object-language on the other side.[33] (§ 38) According to Gilbert Ryle there is
a difference between applying a rule of inference, which the tortoise does not
do (a kind of knowing how) or refuses to do and the acknowledgement of the
propositional content (a kind of knowing that).[34] (It seems that, for Ryle,
to know how to do something or to apply it is prior to the knowledge of the
rules or the propositional content.) The difference between metalanguage and
object-language has to be considered to understand the status of the inferences.
I believe, it is therefore wrong to directly go from the modus ponens to impli-
cations like e.g. Friedrich Kambartel and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer suggest[35]
(212/213):
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(3) p and p→ q then q
The first formulation (1) is a rule of inference in the metalanguage, while the
other formulation (3) is within the object-language of propositional logic. Even
the attempt to write it similar like the rule of inference does fall short of the
difference in scope and use, because the sentence or proposition q cannot be
detached and the implication cannot be eliminated in the object-language. The
correct formulation would be:
(4) ((p→ q) ∧ p)→ q
It is a compounded sentence in the object-language that cannot be dissolved in
seperate propositions. It is one proposition. The usage of the rule of inference
in a meta-language, like e.g. the calculus of propositional logic, allows to use the
detached and derived consequent as a premise and add it to the “true” or valid
“set” of propositions (Σ). The requirement for propositional logic is then that
a contradicton cannot be derived, because this would lead to an inconsistent or
incoherent “set” of propositions. At least for propositional logic such a calculus
can be developed.
A sentence only has meaning, if it is embedded in a logical context by the
logical connector. The inferential relations show which role the sentences plays,
if it is a premise or a consequent. In a metalanguage the derived consequent
could also serve as a premise, but that would be to abstract from the original
role it played and to not consider the context or circumstances under which it
was implied. The propositions in a metalanguage are just names of propositions
(hence the greek letters to make that difference). They are not used and have
no meaning. They are abstract and empty placeholders. Only in the logical
context of an object-language they can have meaning. Propositions cannot be
detached from their conditions, otherwise it would also not be an inferential
semantics. In a way one needs to consider their place in the right language
game (cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein).
5 Evaluation of Inferential Relations
Models that learn inferential relations are the foundation for reasoning. They
represent a knowledge of the world. (The statements are descpritions of pictures
like in the SNLI corpus.) An important questions is, whether the inferential
relations are representing good inferences. How can one contradictory statement
be better than another one? Or how can one entailment statement be better
than another one? If we would take this into account, we could introduce more
fine grained logical connectors, but then one might have to introduce an infinite
number of logical connectors. The approach that I propose is based on the web
of inferential relations that can be represented.
Meaning is not only represented in one inferential relation it is part of a
whole web of inferences. It is within a possible space of reasoning and that in-
cludes more possible premises and consequences of the statements. Evans et. al.
10
(2018) introduce a model that learns to recognize relations of possible “entail-
ment between logical formulas”.[17] It would be an interesting task to combine
this model with the model of Bowman et al. (2015a) that learns inferential
relations of natural language[19] to widen the logical space of possible relations.
It could make explicit further inferences. This inferences can lead to further
statements, like mentioned above. It is correct to state that a chair is not an
animal, while it is incorrect to state that a bird is not an animal. Of course, it
relies also on the entailment that birds are animals. Meaning can only be un-
derstood within a web of inferences. This would allow the model to self-assess
the goodness of inferences and make it possible to discard bad inferences.
Deductive reasoning fails to give an adequate account of (human) reasoning.
Inductive reasoning has strengths and with a lot of data and statistical methods
powerful tools have been developed, but does it give an account of (human)
reasoning and what could be considered as a good explanation of something.
To understand the goodness of inferences means to assess the normative part of
reasoning.
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